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**Global Governance: Pure Rhetoric or a New Perspective?**

**A Review Essay**

**Abdullah Enes Tüzgen**

Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ibnî Haldun University, [enes.tuzgen@ihu.edu.tr](mailto:enes.tuzgen@ihu.edu.tr)

**Abstract**

This paper examines usefulness of the concept of global governance in understanding world politics. More specifically it aims at answering two questions: On the practical level, is there global governance in operation in the world today? In other words, is the world we are living function more with institutions and norms of global governance? On the theoretical level, can global governance framework offer us anything more than traditional theories of international relations to comprehend world politics? The paper first proposes a new method to classify the literature on global governance. After analyzing the works and arguments of the main camps of the debate, the paper answers both questions affirmatively. Global governance theory can contribute to our understanding especially with regard to multiple actors and multiple layers of politics, and historical change in IR.

**Keywords:** *Global governance, IR theory, globalization, international norms, international institutions*

**I. Introduction**

The concept of Global Governance (GG) fuelled novel academic debates especially after 1990s. For the proponents of the concept, GG is the new way we should take to understand global

politics. According to that argument, we live in a qualitatively different world and that new world necessitates new theories and concepts to be understood; and GG offers a good framework for this. For skeptics, on the other hand, GG is just a heuristic device that does not promise a lot to the students of international relations. Moreover, it is not correct that contemporary world is a qualitatively different place; and so we do not need a new theory to understand it.

In this paper, I will discuss that debate between supporters of GG as a new theory to understand world politics and its opponents. More specifically, I will answer the following questions: Is there GG? Is it useful? Do we need it? What can it offer us that IR theory cannot? I argue that a GG Theory can help us to understand three significant aspects of the contemporary world: multiple actors, multiple layers of politics, and historical change in IR.

The organization of the paper is as follows: in the next section I discuss GG from a conceptual point of view. Why is it *global* and why is it *governance*? In the third section I assess if GG is “real” in the sense that if we are living in a world of more governance in the global scale. The fourth section is about assessing normative value of GG. The fifth section is about GG as a theory on world politics.

## **II. GG: Why Global, Why Governance?**

The concept of Global Governance is composed of two “G”s: Global and Governance. What do they refer to? The first term, global, implies two things: First, there is a connection or assumed association with the process and phenomenon of globalization. GG is only possible in an interacting and inter-connected world. It is impossible for political entities that live in isolation from one another with no (or very limited) interaction to develop something like GG. Political communities in the Americas before the discovery of the continent by the Europeans, or political

systems in the ancient China and ancient Europe cannot be part of a GG. For the governance to be global, there has to be an interconnected and an interdependent world.<sup>1</sup>

In that sense, the process of globalization and the novelties it produces is central to GG. Transformations in communication technologies, increased speed of transportation, and the ease in reaching to knowledge have created a much more interconnected world. Consequently, as Rosenau writes, they decreased the costs of political consciousness and activism.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, trade relations, movements of goods, capital and services have grown to an incredible level. Held and McGrew write that 60,000 multinational corporations with nearly 820,000 foreign subsidiaries operate in global economy. “They account for 25 percent of world production and 70 percent of world trade.”<sup>3</sup> Such inter-connected economic transactions not only affected the benefits of international trade (at least for some of its practitioners), but also its risks, which also became global. That means, economic crises have become contagious and global.<sup>4</sup> Hence they need Global Governance.

One may ask that is not contradictory that on the one hand we make a reference to globalization which is generally considered as a post-1980 phenomenon, yet on the other hand some of the theorists who write about global governance make reference to 19<sup>th</sup> century Concert system as a source of GG?<sup>5</sup> I think it is not. That is because some of the normative and functional sources of contemporary GG can be traced back to 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe, such as diplomacy, international law, concerts, conferences etc. It can be seen as the expansion of European international society, to borrow a term from the English School, to the whole globe.<sup>6</sup> In addition,

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<sup>1</sup> For the concept of interdependence in IR: Keohane and Nye (1977) *Power and Interdependence*

<sup>2</sup> Rosenau (1992) “Governance, order, and change in world politics” in Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*

<sup>3</sup> Held and McGrew (2002) *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance*

<sup>4</sup> On the adverse effects of globalization of capitalism: Glyn, A. (2006) *Capitalism Unleashed: Finance, Globalization, Welfare*

<sup>5</sup> For example Mitzen (2013) *Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance*

<sup>6</sup> Bull, H. (1977) *The Anarchical Society*

19<sup>th</sup> century displays some of the characteristics of the contemporary globalization. The rise of international trade, increased interaction, revolutions of technologies and transportation are some of the features of 19<sup>th</sup> century world which make it similar to post 1980s globalization.

In addition to its reference to globalization, there is a second implication of the concept of Global. That is, the phenomenon that the proponents of the concept wants to understand is not national, sub-national or inter-national. Although it aims at including all, it is more than the sum of its parts. Global governance is meant to combine multi-layered interactions in politics.<sup>7</sup> In that sense it is a challenge to the more widespread and accepted concept of “inter-national.” GG defends that the mainstream understanding of global politics as “politics among nations”<sup>8</sup> is inadequate to analyze politics in contemporary era. It is inadequate because we need to have a multi-layered (i.e.: local, sub-national, national, inter-national and global) and multi-actor (states, NGOs, IOs, TANS, TNCs etc.) perspective which mainstream IR theories lack.<sup>9</sup> As a skeptic to ‘globalness’ of governance in world politics, Gilpin’s title of his chapter in an edited volume is illustrative: while all other contributors choose the concept of “global governance”, he prefers “international governance.”<sup>10</sup>

Let me turn to the second term in GG: governance. What is the implications of it, and against which concepts is it positioned? It is an interesting term because, as Rosenau argues, many of the languages other than English, such as German and Japanese, do not have an equivalent word for it.<sup>11</sup> Young defines governance as the “establishment and operation of social institutions.”<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Rosenau (1992)

<sup>8</sup> Morgenthau (1949) *Politics Among Nations*

<sup>9</sup> I will discuss these terms more in detail below.

<sup>10</sup> Gilpin (2002) “A Realist Perspective on International Governance” in Held and McGrew (2005)

<sup>11</sup> Rosenau (2005) “Global Governance as Disaggregated Complexity” in Ba and Hoffman (2005)

<sup>12</sup> Young quoted in Dunne (2005) in Ba and Hoffman

This is a too broad definition. To narrow it down, in line with many theorists of GG such as Czempiel and Rosenau, we should focus on the difference governance has from the concept of government. An easy yet widely accepted definition would be governance is governing without a government. Czempiel defines governance as “the capacity to get things done without the legal competence to command that they be done.”<sup>13</sup> Czempiel and Rosenau’s book title exemplifies such an understanding: “Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics.”<sup>14</sup> Rosenau writes that “in a world where authority is undergoing continuous relocation – both outward toward supranational entities and inward toward subnational groups – it becomes increasingly imperative to probe how governance can occur in the absence of government.”<sup>15</sup>

Defenders of such an understanding follow two lines of argument. On the one hand, people like Koenig-Archibugi,<sup>16</sup> and Imber,<sup>17</sup> focus on the functions governments perform, and argue that governance is the performance of certain functions associated with government without a central authority. Koenig-Archibugi writes modern states have developed because they were better than other alternatives in fulfilling the tasks people demanded from them like defense against threats and containment of physical violence among citizens. GG emerged because of global transformations, states are no longer able to perform these tasks.<sup>18</sup> The most important functions of governments include law making and arbitration. The more these functions are performed by non-governmental bodies and IOs, the more governance we observe. “Most nations’ shipping laws are written at the IMO [International Maritime Organization] in London, air safety laws at the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] in Montreal, food standards at the FAO [Food

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<sup>13</sup> Czempiel (1992) “Governance and Democratization” in Rosenau and Czempiel (1992)

<sup>14</sup> Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*

<sup>15</sup> Rosenau (1992) “Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics” in Rosenau and Czempiel (1992)

<sup>16</sup> Koenig-Archibugi (2002) “Mapping Global Governance”

<sup>17</sup> Imber, M (2005) “Functionalism” in Held and McGrew (2002)

<sup>18</sup> Koenig-Archibugi (2002)

and Agriculture Organization] in Rome (...).”<sup>19</sup> The functionalist logic of governance is central not only to proponents of GG but also to those who are skeptical of it. Gilpin, for example, writes that GG should not be seen as a powerful explanatory concept because international institutions cannot perform most important *functions* of governments, such as coinage, taxation, and national security.<sup>20</sup>

Besides those who view governance basically as task performance, some other scholars, like those associated with Cosmopolitanism, attribute a wider significance to governance than the functionalist logic.<sup>21</sup> In such an understanding has more normative implication. Accordingly, in addition to performing functions of government, governance is seen as a different form of engagement with others without a central authority. That different form of engagement is primarily based dialogue and consensus. During the problem solving process and performance of functions mentioned above, the parties taking part in governance mechanisms are believed to share common goals and shared rationality. Discussion and negotiation are crucial components in such an understanding of governance.<sup>22</sup> Thus, governance is seen as the proper way of interaction in an environment without a central authority. That understanding of governance has its critics too, which I will deal more in length below. Mainly they argue that such a conception of GG obscures power relations.<sup>23</sup>

### III. Is Global Governance Real?

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<sup>19</sup> Braithwaite and Drahos (1999) quoted in Held and McGrew (2002) p.10

<sup>20</sup> Gilpin (2002)

<sup>21</sup> Held

<sup>22</sup> Murphy writes Habermas champions international institutions to restore and further democratic project. Murphy (2000)

<sup>23</sup> See below; and Wilkinson and Hughes (2002) *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives*

There is no logical necessity between *global* and *governance*. That is to say, governance can be done in multiple layers of social and political world, like in local or sub-national politics. When we combine two terms as GG, however, we start to talk about a new concept with idiosyncratic characteristics. The literature that talk about GG is diverse. Ba and Hoffman identifies 9 different uses of the term in the literature, including but not limited to international regimes, international society, hegemonic stability, and dynamics of globalization.<sup>24</sup> The overviews of that diverse literature usually divides discussion on GG into two. Dingwerth and Pattberg, for example, write that we can read GG literature as analytic and normative sections.<sup>25</sup> Ba and Hoffman adds a third category. For them GG should be analyzed in a tripartite concept: GG as a phenomenon, GG as a project, and GG as a worldview.<sup>26</sup> I will discuss first two of these categories (phenomenon/descriptive and normative/project) in this section; and I will deal with GG as a worldview in the next section.

Let me start with GG as a description of the world we live in (i.e.: GG as a phenomenon). Although both those who defend GG as helpful lenses to look and describe the world we live in and those who oppose this look at the same world, it is interesting to see how their descriptions are contrasting. In other words, although the facts about contemporary political world, such as increased number of IOs, increase of codified international laws, rise of NGOs and Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), spread of fast communication and transportation technology, rise of literacy etc., are accepted as facts by both groups, the meaning they attribute to these changes, and the belief in their effects on world politics is a matter of intense debate. According to the meaning they attribute to these material changes, we see two broad camps with reference to GG. On the one


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<sup>24</sup> Young (1997); Bull (1977); Gilpin (1981); Mittleman (1997) – all quoted in Ba and Hoffman (2005) *Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, Contestation and World Order*

<sup>25</sup> Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006) “Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics” *Global Governance* 12(2)

<sup>26</sup> Ba and Hoffman (2005) Chapter 1

hand, we have those who believe that these changes are not (and should not be) central to our understanding of world politics. On the other, there are those who believe that we need to take these changes into account to conceptualize world politics today.



*i. GG as Pure Rhetoric:* For the first group of people, neither the rise in the number of IOs or INGOs nor technological changes that affected pace of communication and transportation, nor changing logics of capitalism has resulted into a qualitative change in world politics. Thus, talks on GG are neither necessary nor useful. Various strands in realism fall into that camp. For structural realists like Gilpin, for example, GG is at best pure rhetoric, at worst a utopian aspiration.<sup>27</sup> Similarly Sterling-Folker, who identifies herself as a neo-classical realist, asserts that GG is like

<sup>27</sup> Gilpin (2001) *Global Political Economy*



“studying imaginary dragons”, meaning that it misses the real logic of international system which is power politics.<sup>28</sup> Such a skepticism both for the effect of new international institutions and for the usefulness of GG stems from a couple of reasons, which are intrinsic to the logic of realism. First, for realists, the structure of international system is anarchic: there is no central authority to make laws and to enforce them.<sup>29</sup> Second, states are main actors in international politics and they are rational cost-benefit calculating agents.<sup>30</sup> Besides, the system is a self-help situation and you cannot be certain about others intentions.<sup>31</sup>

These basic realist principles make IOs, international law, social norms and other actors, which are important for GG’s description of the world, redundant. To put it differently, changes in world politics, which necessitates a new kind of analysis according to defenders of GG, are “epiphenomenal.”<sup>32</sup> To borrow a terms from Marxism, these features of world politics (i.e.: IOs, norms, NGOs etc.) are part of superstructure, while the base is defined by power politics and balance of power logic. Sterling-Folker writes “It is not simply that the powerful determine how to ‘do business’ with one another in a utilitarian, rule-system sense. It is, in addition and more importantly, that the powerful determine who counts as an appropriate entity, what counts as an appropriate activity, and what counts as existence itself for any given period of time.”<sup>33</sup>

I think, what is more central in understanding the realist reaction of “GG is a utopian aspiration” than the premises of theory, such as state-centricism or anarchy, is that from a realist eye the essence of international politics is unchanging. The way we should understand ancient

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<sup>28</sup> Sterling-Folker (2005) “Realist GG: Revisiting *cave! Hic dragones* and Beyond” in Ba and Hoffman (2005)

<sup>29</sup> Waltz (1979) *The Theory of International Politics*

<sup>30</sup> Mearshimer (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*

<sup>31</sup> Waltz (1979)

<sup>32</sup> Mearshimer (1995) “The False Promise of International Institutions” *International Security*

<sup>33</sup> Sterling-Folker (2005) p.24

Greek city-states, for example, is not different from the way we should analyze Punic Wars, or the Cold War. International politics has an unchanging essence; and that belief form the basis for basic premises of theory. While for structural realists the source of that continuity is states quest for survival in anarchy, for classical and neo-classical realists it is the human nature.<sup>34</sup> How such a conception of unchanging international politics is related to GG is that one of the important claims of those who argue GG is not a “cheap talk” as realists assert is that the change in world politics is possible, real, and that change requires new lenses. The change can be a post-1980s globalization phenomenon as some liberal GG people, like McGrew argues<sup>35</sup>, or it can be a post-19<sup>th</sup> century phenomenon as Cronin,<sup>36</sup> and Mitzen writes<sup>37</sup>, or it can be a post-15<sup>th</sup> century expansion of international society as English School claims.<sup>38</sup>

As opposed to those who believe that we do not see a qualitative change in world politics and that GG is pure rhetoric, there is the second camp of scholars who argue that we need to talk about IOs, norms, international institutions, and non-state actors to understand world politics. If we define GG as multi-layered and multi-actor interaction and norm/law making, people with theoretical perspectives that allow talking about these multiple layers and multiple actors, and international law/norm development can be broadly categorized as scholars who think that GG is real. I am aware that that is a broad categorization and a wide description of GG. Yet, I believe that if one’s theoretical perspective enables giving agency to non-state actors (such as IOs, classes, genders, experts etc.) and does not invalidates power of ideas and norms, then s/he can meaningfully engage with GG either in an approving or critical manner. Contrary to realists,

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<sup>34</sup> Sterling-Folker (2005)

<sup>35</sup> McGrew (2005) “Liberal Internationalism: Between Realism and Cosmopolitanism”

<sup>36</sup> Cronin, B. (1999) *Community Under Anarchy*

<sup>37</sup> Mitzen (2013) *Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance*

<sup>38</sup> Bull (1977)

broadly defined, GG in one form or another is real for these people. This understanding is in parallel to Rosenau's broad definition of GG: "GG is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity from the family to the international organizations in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions."<sup>39</sup>

We can categorize theorists who think there is qualitative change in history so we need new theories to understand it, and that it is important to talk about GG broadly defined, into two groups. On the one hand, there are those who think of GG as a post-1980 phenomenon that coincide with the process of globalization. On the other hand, some other theorists believe that GG as a world order can be traced back into history; at least a couple of centuries back. Let me start with the latter first.

**ii. GG as a Historical Phenomenon:** One of the important components of GG is that it envisions a kind of world order. There are three theories that both share such a vision (i.e.: order in world politics is more than what realists believe) and traces back its history to a few centuries back. To begin with, writers like Cronin,<sup>40</sup> Mitzen<sup>41</sup> and Schröder<sup>42</sup> argue that the roots of contemporary world order, and GG can be traced back to 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe. According to that argument, we observe a significant transformation in the way politics is conducted among European superpowers. Cronin, for example, assert that the identities of major European states have transformed from more severe hostility to a common identity. The category of "great power" generated a new understanding of politics in the sense that those who belong to that club were expected to act in a certain way. For instance, it was not acceptable for any of the great powers to act unilaterally

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<sup>39</sup> Rosenau quoted in Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006) "Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics"

<sup>40</sup> Cronin, B. (1999) *Community Under Anarchy*

<sup>41</sup> Mitzen (2013) *Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance*

<sup>42</sup> Schroeder (1996) *The Transformation of European Politics: 1763-1848*

without informing other great powers on an issue related to land expansion.<sup>43</sup> The significance of such a transformation of politics in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe for the discussion on GG is that, for these authors the importance of international institutions, norms, laws and order in GG of 21<sup>st</sup> century can also be observed in 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe. Mitzen's book's sub-title signifies that: "19<sup>th</sup> Century Origins of Global Governance." Hence, GG is not only real but also historical. Holsti also analyzes 19<sup>th</sup> century governance with reference to the concepts of authority and legitimacy.<sup>44</sup> He writes that although realist analysts, like Jervis,<sup>45</sup> argues that the concert turned into a balance of power system too quickly, concerts and balance are not opposite and mutually exclusive categories for 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe. Without territorial balance, the concert was not possible.

Two other theoretical currents analyze contemporary GG and world order from a historical perspective: English School and World-Systems Theory. Scholars associated with English School, like Bull,<sup>46</sup> and Dunne,<sup>47</sup> for example, argue that contemporary world order is a product of post-Westphalian and post-Augsburg arrangements. Creation of sovereign states in Europe, and later expansion of that system to the rest of the world characterizes contours of the world we live in. According to Dunne, "global governance ought to date back as far as the emergence of sovereign states and the rudimentary institutions established to regulate their conduct."<sup>48</sup> Such a state centricism, however, is accompanied by certain international institutions in the English School narrative, like international law, and diplomacy. These institutions form the basis for a society of states. Although somewhat different from the institutions later GG literature talk about, the

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<sup>43</sup> Cronin (1999) Chapter 1

<sup>44</sup> Holsti, K. J. (1992) "Governance without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics" in Rosenau and Czempiel (1992)

<sup>45</sup> Jervis (1985) "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation" *World Politics* 38, quoted in Holsti (1992)

<sup>46</sup> Bull (1977) *The Anarchical Society*

<sup>47</sup> Dunne (1998) *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*

<sup>48</sup> Dunne (2005) "Global Governance: An English School Perspective" in Ba and Hoffman (2005) p. 75

importance shared understandings and norms have in the English School is in certain ways similar GG. Dunne writes that “perhaps the most important overlap between the English School and global governance is that both try to theorize ‘how the world hangs together’.”<sup>49</sup> To recap, for these theorists, to understand contemporary GG as a phenomenon, one has to go back to the roots of institutionalization process of the modern world order.

The last theoretical perspective I would like to discuss that analyzes contemporary governance with a special emphasis on its historical origins is World-Systems Theory.<sup>50</sup> Like English School, World-Systems Theory analyses trace back the roots of modern governance to 15<sup>th</sup> century. Nevertheless, unlike English School’s emphasis on creation of new political structures (i.e.: modern state), World-Systems Theory focuses on the creation of capitalist world economy as the defining logic of global governance. According to the argument, emergence of the capitalist mode of production in the 15<sup>th</sup> century Europe and expansion of it to the whole globe in subsequent centuries connected different parts of the world in a unique way. To understand global governance, one has to look at the functioning of that system. Arrighi and Silver’s “Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System” aims at uncovering that logic.<sup>51</sup> The authors argue that hegemonic powers in each century since the 16<sup>th</sup> century (Genoese, Dutch, British and American centuries) were main organizers of governance mechanisms. Arrighi writes that “the structures and processes of the contemporary world system can only be understood in the light of the system’s entire lifetime, from its earliest beginnings in early modern Europe to the present.”<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid p.74

<sup>50</sup> Wallerstein (1974) *The Modern World System*; and Arrighi and Silver (1999) *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System*

<sup>51</sup> Arrighi and Silver (1999); and Arrighi (2005) “Global Governance and Hegemony in the Modern World System” in Ba and Hoffman

<sup>52</sup> Arrighi (2005) p. 57

Although at first glance that seems like a state-centric analysis similar to realism (especially hegemonic stability theory of Gilpin<sup>53</sup>), there are significant differences. Non-state actors, like social and economic classes have crucial roles in this analysis. Similarly, economic mode of production is the defining logic in it. One might also ask that although for GG norms are crucial in understanding world politics, World-System analysis is more concerned with material relations. Although there is some truth in this criticism, more Gramscian variants of Marxian analyses of GG do not disregard significance of norms and ideational factors. For Cox, for instance, without the hegemonic leadership of historical classes and cross-cutting coalitions that are made possible by internationalization of the state, it is impossible to comprehend the workings of GG.<sup>54</sup>

*iii. GG as a Contemporary Phenomenon:* There are two general theoretical currents (with many internal divisions) that see GG more as a contemporary phenomenon of post-1980s world. Different from realists, for these group of people GG is real, and not epiphenomenal. And different from theorists who focus more on the historical roots of GG in previous centuries, these groups of scholars are more interested in the novelties of contemporary world order like the effects of globalization, while they do not necessarily oppose the insights of scholars with historical orientations. The first groups of theorists who see GG more as a contemporary phenomenon have more liberal, and cosmopolitan and liberal internationalist ideas.<sup>55</sup> The second groups, on the other hand, are more critical of the propositions of first group and hold critical post-colonial and post-

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<sup>53</sup> Gilpin (1981) *War and Change in World Politics*

<sup>54</sup> Cox and Sinclair (1996) *Approaches to World Order*

<sup>55</sup> Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) *Governance without Government*; Held and McGrew (2002) *Governing Globalization*

structuralist views.<sup>56</sup> The common point between these two groups is that they discuss GG with a “conscious effort to break with traditional approaches.”<sup>57</sup>

Let me begin with the first group. Scholars like Rosenau, Cziempel, and Held are largely responsible for popularization of GG concept in understanding contemporary world. As I briefly discussed above, proponents of GG as a useful concept to analyze world politics believe that transformations in world politics, change in technology, dominance of democratic discourse, effectiveness of multiple actors etc. have produced a different world than the past. Emphasizing new aspects of post-Cold War world, Rosenau writes that “states are still active and important, to be sure, but their participation in the processes of world politics is nevertheless of a different, less dominating kind, thereby leading to the interpretation that fundamental systemic change has occurred.”<sup>58</sup> He discusses these transformations with two hybrid words: “fragnegration” and “glocalization.”<sup>59</sup> Fragnegration refers to two contradictory movements in world politics. On the one hand, there is increasing integration; political units come together to form larger entities like the EU.<sup>60</sup> On the other hand, there are fragmentation movements that try to dismantle certain existing units into smaller pieces like local nationalist movements.<sup>61</sup> Glocalization refers to similar contradictory forces between globalization and localization.

These contradictory movements produce a complex world. Complexity is the key word to understand GG. After now, nothing will be simple as “look great powers to understand the world”

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<sup>56</sup> Wilkinson and Hughes (2002) *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives*; Murphy (2000) “Global Governance Poorly Done, Poorly Understood” *International Affairs* 76(4)

<sup>57</sup> Ba and Hoffman (2005) p.5

<sup>58</sup> Rosenau (1992)

<sup>59</sup> Rosenau (2005)

<sup>60</sup> Ba argues that regional institutions may actually compete with globalizing tendencies: Ba (2005) “Contested Spaces: The Politics Regional and Global Governance” in Ba and Hoffman (2005)

<sup>61</sup> For a discussion of integration and fragmentation in world politics from a different point of view see Kaufman, S. (1997) “The Fragmentation and Consolidation of International Systems” *IO* 51(2)

kind of advice. There are important actors in world politics other than states, like IOs, NGOs, INGOs, TANS, TNCs, epistemic communities, international institutions etc., that operate in multiple layers of social life, like local, sub-national, national, inter-national, trans-national and global. For example, Zacher writes that “in 1909 there were 37 IGOs and 176 NGOs; in 1951 the respective figures were 123 and 832; and in 1986 they were 337 and 4,649.”<sup>62</sup> The permutation of these actors with multiple layers produce almost infinite number of interactions that are significant to understand politics. One should also add that these multiple actors operating in multiple layers have their own “sphere of authority” (SOA).<sup>63</sup>

Moreover, Rosenau cites 8 novelties specific to the era of globalization: micro-electronic technologies, skill revolution, organizational explosion, bifurcation of global structures, mobility upheaval, weakening of territoriality, authority crisis, and globalization of national economies.<sup>64</sup> That means, contrary to more traditional understandings of world politics which see national level as hierarchic and international level as anarchic, from a GG perspective this is oversimplification because in the contemporary world each actor has some degree of authority over an issue-area, geography or people. That authority is again different from traditional conceptions of it as material enforcement capabilities. The authorities of these new actors stem more from their perceived legitimacy by others than from their enforcement capacities with material power. Legitimacy is a source of authority, as Hurd argues, because although it is different from threats and incentives that get people to do certain things, legitimacy can still convince people to act in a certain way, and shape their choices.<sup>65</sup> Hence, if an actor or institution is perceived as legitimate it has authority.

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<sup>62</sup> Zacher, M. (1992) “The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance.” in Rosenau and Czempel

<sup>63</sup> Rosenau (2005) “GG as Disaggregated Complexity”

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

<sup>65</sup> Hurd, I. (1999) “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics” *IO* 53(2)



When we have multiple actors with multiple SOAs, the area of influence of these actors over which they exercise their authority overlaps; and we have overlapping SOAs.

Liberal internationalists and liberal cosmopolitans share many points of such a characterization of GG. McGrew writes that contemporary GG is the realization of liberal internationalist project the history of which goes back to T. Paine, Mill and Kant.<sup>66</sup> Similarly from a liberal cosmopolitan point of view, Held argues that IOs' influence on world politics, porous boundaries of states, and universalization of human rights, which are the features GG emphasizes, are part of the cosmopolitan vision of politics.<sup>67</sup> As a regime theorist Young draws parallels with international regimes and GG. He argues that regimes may constitute "best available option" for realization of GG.<sup>68</sup>

*iv. Contemporary, yet Critical People:* Scholars who are associated with critical perspectives such as post-structuralism and post-colonialism see GG as a form of governing in the post-fordist, neo-liberal late modernity. For them, GG is the latest stage of neo-liberal ordering of the world. It is real in the sense that different actors do influence international politics in multiple layers of social life. And GG is contemporary in the sense that the techniques that are used to create world order are novel and different from liberalism's technologies of government, say, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. From such a perspective, GG is seen as "a particular technology of rule" and it is placed within the "much longer trajectory of liberal political reason."<sup>69</sup> Scholars with post-structural and post-colonial orientations argue that GG is an ordering mechanism which works as a productive power to constitute agencies and to define what is possible and what is not in world politics.

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<sup>66</sup> McGrew (2002) "Liberal Internationalism: Between Realism and Cosmopolitanism"

<sup>67</sup> Held (2002) "Cosmopolitanism: Ideas, Realities and Deficits"

<sup>68</sup> Young, O. (2005) "Regime Theory and the quest for GG" in Ba and Hoffman (2005)

<sup>69</sup> Larner and Walters (2004) *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces* p.17

Some of the critics of GG, like Larner and Walters, use Foucauldian perspective and concepts like governmentality to decipher what GG does.<sup>70</sup> They write that the practice of government involves the production of particular ‘truths’ about the object of governance. As a form of governing, GG also does the same thing: produce ‘truths’ about international politics. In addition, Foucauldian understanding of power which conceptualizes it as diffused interactions, and not owned by a single central authority is the best way to make sense of GG.<sup>71</sup> Multi-actors/multi-layers perspective of GG people, according to that argument, can be analyzed as the exercise of power by many agents without possessing it, in the capillaries of social life.

As far as GG as a phenomenon is concerned, scholars with more post-colonial leanings defend that application of GG is new form of continued colonial relations. Institutions of GG transformed relations of direct domination to more invisible techniques of control.<sup>72</sup>

#### **IV. GG as a Normative Project:**

That division between two camps that see GG as a contemporary phenomenon brings us to the debate over GG as a normative project. Though I discussed many key arguments of each side of the debate when I discussed GG as a phenomenon, GG as a normative project deserves some further discussion. As there are contrasting positions with regard to GG as a phenomenon and the meaning of descriptive statements about the world, there is significant debate with regard to GG as a normative project. What I mean by “GG as a normative project” is that if we are living in a world that has characteristics as GG theorists depict, then one needs to ask whether it is also normatively

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<sup>70</sup> Larner and Walters (2004)

<sup>71</sup> Ibid

<sup>72</sup> Mamdani, M. (1996) *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*

desirable. In other words, should we be happy because of the fact that we are living in a world of GG and so should we aim at advancing it? Or should we be concerned about current affairs of GG?

The debate is mainly between various strands of liberalism, like cosmopolitans,<sup>73</sup> liberal internationalists<sup>74</sup> and neo-liberal institutionalists,<sup>75</sup> and more critical voices like post-colonial and post-structuralist thinkers, some Marxists and neo-Marxists like World-Systems people and Gramscians. For the former group, GG is not only a social and political reality but also a desirable phenomenon. Members of that group assert that more governance produces more peace in world politics. Institutions of global governance like IOs reduce uncertainty and provide valuable information to their members which make miscalculation a rare phenomenon.<sup>76</sup> Similarly, they contribute to trade relations by creating “shadow of the future”<sup>77</sup> and by solving “collective action problem”<sup>78</sup> through monitoring. That results in less wars and more trade which are not only functionally but also normatively good. Similarly, Czempiel argues that “interactions of a global society consisting predominantly of states erected on the Western model will result in a peaceful system of governance.”<sup>79</sup>

Scholars who believe that GG is normatively desirable also emphasize problem-solving capacity of GG. That is to say, some of the problems states and societies face today, such as contagious viruses like SARS and AIDS, global warming, terrorism etc., cannot be solved without widespread cooperation among many actors. Through GG, we can solve these individually unsolvable problems, and that would benefit all humanity. In that sense expert knowledge and role

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<sup>73</sup> Held (2002)

<sup>74</sup> McGrew (2002) *Liberal Internationalism: Between Realism and Cosmopolitanism*

<sup>75</sup> Young (2005)

<sup>76</sup> Keohane (1984) *After Hegemony*

<sup>77</sup> Ibid

<sup>78</sup> Olson, Mancur (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action*; Ostrom, E. (1990) *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*

<sup>79</sup> Rosenau (1992) paraphrases Czempiel’s argument.

of epistemic communities are very important in such an understanding of GG. If we listen to what experts on an issue advise, like economists' suggestion about development policies or financial management, then it will be possible for us to live in a world with less problems. O'Brien defends GG and further connection of people in different parts of the world from a different point of view. He writes that due to increase inter-connection of peoples, in the current era previously marginalized populations and, in fact, majority of world population can benefit from the new world order: "Works on GCS highlights the ability of subordinate groups in different parts of the world to interact and communicate. This opens up the possibility, for the first time, of moving towards a form of world order based on principles that would benefit the majority of the world's population."<sup>80</sup>

I think, what is more important than promotion of peace or problem solving in such a liberal understanding of GG is that it talks about GG as if it is the only, most natural and most rational way of dealing with problems. In that sense GG gains a normative power in the writings of scholars with that perspective. Statements like "IOs are good because they solve problems", "international law is good because they tame anarchy", and "NGOs are good because they help people" etc. naturalize their understanding of GG as a value-free, apolitical concept. In that sense, Foucault's definition of governance make sense: to govern is "to structure the possible fields of actions of others."<sup>81</sup>

In opposition to those who think that GG is a normatively desirable project, scholars from various theoretical backgrounds criticize different aspects of GG as it is currently applied. To begin with, defenders of GG as normative project do not really take power relations into account.<sup>82</sup> The

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<sup>80</sup> O'Brien, R. (2005) "Global Civil Society and Global Governance" in Ba and Hoffman (2005)

<sup>81</sup> Foucault (1982) "The Subject and Power" in Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*

<sup>82</sup> Murphy (2000) "Global governance: poorly done and poorly understood" *International Affairs* 76(4)

world they describe is a place in which unequal distribution of power does have no influence on defining a problem and solution proposals. I think this is problematic. The insufficient discussion of power in GG literature has both theoretical and practical problems. From a theoretical point of view, Barnett and Duvall argue that the concept of power is under-developed in the writings on GG.<sup>83</sup> They develop a matrix of power categories with four main types: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive. I think, though not sufficient, power talk in GG takes more the first two categories into account and totally ignores the latter two. In a similar vein, Hurrell writes that while realists talk about power and liberals talk about GG nobody merges two together and talks about “power in GG.”<sup>84</sup>

In a related way, from a practical point of view, the problem-solving aspect of GG does not take power relations into account either. Liberal GG literature treats all problems as if they are just technical issues, and as a result it depoliticizes political problems. To give an example, although IOs are depicted as neutral, power-blind institutions that just solve problems of coordination, actually they are sites of power. The parties to an agreement or members of an IO never have equal negotiation power.<sup>85</sup> As a result, the results of negotiations are skewed to the benefit of more powerful actors. IMF conditionalities, for instance, are more than solving financial problems of certain countries.<sup>86</sup> They are exercises of imperialism. In his analysis of World Bank’s “Comprehensive Development Framework” (CDF) Cammack writes that CDF turned out to be a

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<sup>83</sup> Barnett and Duvall (2005) *Power in Global Governance*. Chapter 1

<sup>84</sup> Hurrell, A. (2005) “Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality” in Barnett and Duvall (2005)

<sup>85</sup> Hindess, B. (2004) “Liberalism – What’s in a Name?” in Larner and Walter (2004)

<sup>86</sup> Callinicos, A. (2005) “Marxism and GG” in Held and McGrew (2005)

means of tying structural and social issues to a “rigid IMF-prescribed macroeconomic framework and a disciplinary agenda devised and promoted by the Bank.”<sup>87</sup>

Another institution of GG, international law, is also a site of power. Although most common theorized power relation with regard to international law is about how law applies unequally to less powerful members of international community, relations of power with regard to international law is not limited to material capabilities of different nations. Gender should also be considered when discussing power relations in international law. Kinsella convincingly argues that gender relations are reflected to the texts of international law.<sup>88</sup> Her analysis of the evolution of the concept of non-combatants and civilians in the history of international law demonstrates that unequal gender relations are inscribed in the text of international laws. Women are seen as “innocent” in early texts of international war law, because they have no full agency to commit a crime.

Another problem is with the role NGOs play in GG. Although there are many benefits in NGO participation in global politics, there are also certain problems. For example, as Murphy argues, the roles NGOs play in humanitarian crises, such as Rwanda and Darfur, is performed at the expense of depoliticization of crises in these regions.<sup>89</sup> Roles that normally should be performed by political actors are delegated to non-political bodies that work voluntarily and not accountable to anyone. From a feminist standpoint, Steans argue that downsizing of states as a result of neo-liberal policies have affected women negatively. Although NGOs which work to improve the conditions of women in GG do positive things, they are undertaking responsibilities that were formerly the responsibility of the state.<sup>90</sup> Moreover, the NGOs that have access to decision making

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<sup>87</sup> Cammack, P. (2002) “The Mother of All Governments: The World Bank’s Matrix for Global Governance” in Wilkinson and Hughes (2002)

<sup>88</sup> Kinsella, H. (2005) “Securing the Civilian: Sex and Gender in the Laws of War”

<sup>89</sup> Murphy (2000)

<sup>90</sup> Steans, J. (2002) “Global Governance: A Feminist Perspective” in Held and McGrew (2002)

bodies of IGOs are largely from the North: Woods writes that “of the 738 NGOs accredited to Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Seattle, 87 percent were based in industrialized countries.”<sup>91</sup>

The last point I would like to raise with regard to GG as a normative project is about the role of experts and epistemic communities in GG. As I mentioned above, delegating solutions of certain political problems to experts as if they are impartial judges who can write the best receipt for each problem is problematic. The expert knowledge works as a form of power over the recipients of the receipt. To give an example, economists’ advices for attaining development for underdeveloped nations usually take the form of “one size fits all” kind of advice.<sup>92</sup> Moreover, the discourse on development disregard power disparities among nations and do not pay attention to dependency and “development of underdevelopment”, to borrow Frank’s terms.<sup>93</sup> Besides, Jeager shows that the discourse on development increasingly turned into discussions on microeconomic management and self-management of ‘human resources’ from macro-economics and structural reasons.<sup>94</sup> To put it bluntly, according to new discourse, if you are a loser in the new economic order, it is because you have not educate yourself enough.

## V. GG as a Theory on World Politics

In the above discussion, I analyzed why GG as an analytic concept emerged and how it is different from (or similar to) other perspectives on world politics, such as realism, English School,

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<sup>91</sup> Woods, N. (2002) “Global Governance and the Role of Institutions” in Held and McGrew (2002) p.36

<sup>92</sup> Wilkinson, R. (2002) “Global Governance: A Preliminary Interrogation” in Wilkinson and Hughes (2002) *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives*

<sup>93</sup> Frank, A. G. (1969) *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*

<sup>94</sup> Jeager, H. (2007) “‘Global Civil Society’ and the Political Depoliticization of Global Governance”

world systems theory etc. The differences GG wants to bring into political analysis are mainly about the actors in politics, the level of interaction, the roles of norms and international institution, a change in power conceptualization, and a belief in change in IR. In this section, I will discuss three of these differences more in detail especially in comparison to realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Although there will be some repetitions with above, I think it will help to illustrate my argument regarding GG as an independent view on world politics.

**Actors:** To begin with, a GG perspective on world politics differs from other mainstream IR theories with regard to actors they theorize. GG provides a broader list of actors that needs to be taken into account to understand world politics in the era of globalization. For realists the only and most important actors are states. All other actors can have influence on politics as long as states allow them to do so. For neo-liberal institutionalism, on the other hand, while states are primary actors, international institutions have more roles than they have in realism. International institutions can help states to realize their interest by solving coordination problems, reducing transactions costs, creating shadow of the future, providing information and monitoring services to prevent cheating.<sup>95</sup> Although international institutions play these important roles, they are theorized only as agents of states (principles). For neo-liberal institutionalism, international institutions cannot go beyond the functions that are assigned to them by states. That means although international institutions perform important functions for neo-liberal institutionalists, states remain the most important actors in IR. As far as actors in constructivism is concerned, there is nothing that limits a constructivist analysis to state-centric scientific ontology.

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<sup>95</sup> Axelrod and Keohane (1993) "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy" in Baldwin (1993); Keohane (1982) "The Demand for International Regimes" IO



Constructivism as a “meta-theory” can accommodate non-state actors in politics and can attribute significant roles to them. Yet, there are two problems with regard to constructivism’s understanding of actors in politics from a GG point of view. First, the theoretical capacity of constructivism to include non-state actors notwithstanding, some constructivists, most notably Wendt, choose a state-centric path in their analyses. Wendt argues that he is a state-centric constructivist because in the contemporary IR setting, states are the most decisive actors.<sup>96</sup> A second problem with regard to constructivism’s position on actors in international politics is that although there is no theoretical limitation for constructivism to talk about the roles of non-state actors, there is no theoretical necessity to do so either. That is to say, as Hoffman puts it constructivism is agnostic for certain aspects of GG.<sup>97</sup> Since constructivism is not a “substantial theory”, in the words of Wendt, it does not guide the researcher towards specific actors. It is up to the researcher’s discretion to find out which actors are important in each historical epoch.

GG perspective, on the other hand, is different from these approaches. In contrast to realism, for GG theory, states are not the only and most important actors. Different from neo-liberal institutionalism, more role is given to international institutions, even something like quasi-independent law-making.<sup>98</sup> And different from constructivism, GG is a substantial theory that talks about the actors specifically of this historical epoch of globalization. Let me explain these arguments:

One of the main components of a theory of GG is the way it approaches to question of agency in world politics. GG perspective defends that traditional IR perspectives cannot understand politics in global world because they are state-biased. Although some GG theorists,

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<sup>96</sup> Wendt (1999)

<sup>97</sup> Hoffman (2005)

<sup>98</sup> Alvarez (2005) *International Organizations as Law-Makers*

like Rosenau writes that states are still important, that does not mean that they gain importance at the expense of other actors. Wolfish and Smith argue that discussing the question of multiple actors in world politics with reference to loss of state power (i.e.: if other actors gain power, states are losing it) is a biased discussion itself because such an argument assumes the premise of realism that power is finite in politics.<sup>99</sup> In other words, only if one thinks of power as a zero-sum game between actors, s/he can argue that other actors gain power at the expense of states. This is wrong. New actors generate their own power bases through spheres of authorities. Moreover, they argue that although GG defends that there is a proliferation of actors in the contemporary world, this may be the case even in all history.<sup>100</sup> Non-state actors, like pope in Europe, caliph in the Muslim world in the Middle Ages etc. were all political actors who did not always possess state powers. From that perspective, the reason why we just stick with state-as-actors belief is the biases of mainstream IR theories. Though non-state actors have always been with us, it was necessary for us to change our lenses to see them.

To be more specific, who are these multiple actors that we need to take into consideration in world politics according to GG? Wolfish and Smith write that there are six categories of actors: 1) states, 2) global city-regions, 3) IGOs, 4) non-state actors (like corporations, rating agencies), 5) quasi-state institutions (like central banks), and 6) transnational communities.<sup>101</sup> The importance attributed to these actors varies from theorists to theorists. For Sinclair, for instance, the distinctive feature of contemporary GG is about the role played by private institutions like bond-rating agencies, because they represent the peak of privatization of authority in world politics.<sup>102</sup> Alvarez,

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<sup>99</sup> Wolfish and Smith (2000)

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Wolfish and Smith (2000) "Governance in a Multi-Centric World"

<sup>102</sup> Sinclair (2005) "A Private Authority Perspective on Global Governance" in Ba and Hoffman

on the other hand, focuses more on the roles IOs play in global governance.<sup>103</sup> For him, a complex web of rules, norms, and laws characterizes IOs' influence in regulating the world. Certain rulings of IOs, even if they are not formally authorized to make international law, accumulate over time; and through mechanisms like self/cross-referencing, interpreting the text in a new way etc. creates new body of international law produced by IOs that regulate global governance.

Though it goes without saying, one should notice that presence of multiple actors implies that these actors have varying degrees of authority over certain people, geography, or issue. Without acknowledging that multiple actors have authority, it makes no sense to talk about them. The spheres of authorities of these multiple actors overlap. This is also related to the fact that individuals now have multiple loyalties sometimes in a coexisting and sometimes conflicting ways. A person's membership to a state as citizen and his/her membership to an NGO as a volunteer may dictate conflicting demands. Keck and Sikkink illustrate that point in their discussions of Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs).<sup>104</sup> Being a member of a human rights advocacy network lead individuals to struggle against the sovereign state they belong to with the help of NGOs from other states to whom they voluntarily have "loyalty." That insight of GG points out a significant difference it has from IR theories that make a radical distinction between national and international politics. We need to understand multiple actors with reference to transformation of norm of sovereignty.

**Layers:** The distinction traditional IR theories make between national and international politics brings us to the second difference a GG theory has from IR theories. It is related to the question of "what should the level of analysis of international/global politics?" For both neo-realism and neo-

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<sup>103</sup> Alvarez (2005) IOs as Law-Makers

<sup>104</sup> Keck and Sikkink (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders*

liberal institutionalism, international political analyses should base on systemic level. It is the anarchic nature of the international system that primarily defines the behavior of units (i.e.: states) in it. This is because unit-level attributes of states do not cause a real difference between their behaviors. Moreover, states are treated as black boxes, and like-units. Sub-state levels of politics are not necessary to be taken into consideration. For such a systemic perspective “real” politics is taking place among nations in the inter-state level.

As far as constructivism is concerned, the points I raised above with regard to actors are valid here too. Some constructivist scholars like Wendt,<sup>105</sup> and Finnemore and Sikkink<sup>106</sup> focus more on systemic level of analysis. For Wendt, identities of states are constituted through interaction of states in the international system. Similarly for Finnemore and Sikkink, states socializing in international system adopts international norms. Though there are constructivist works that focus on non-systemic sources of identity formation and political processes, like Hopf,<sup>107</sup> and Weldes,<sup>108</sup> constructivism offers no substantial theory of multiple-layers of political processes in the era of globalization.

GG theory can make a contribution to analyses of world politics with respect to multiple-layers of politics taking place in the contemporary era. Although mainstream perspectives theorize a tripartite levels of analysis (systemic-level, state-level, and individual-level), we need both to transcend that classic categorization by adding new layers into it, and we should think how these multiple layers of politics interact with one another. GG theory has necessary theoretical and analytical tools for this task. Thanks to transformations in communication and transportation

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<sup>105</sup> Wendt (1999)

<sup>106</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”

<sup>107</sup> Hopf, T. (2012). *Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945-1958*.

<sup>108</sup> Weldes, J. (1999). *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*

technology, politics in a local community can easily be linked to global politics. Local human rights violations in one part of the world can become concern of millions of people over a short period of time through activism and advocacy strategies.

GG scholars talk about local, sub-national, national, international, transnational, and global layers of politics. These layers interact in idiosyncratic way with multiple-actors I discussed in the previous section. What are the consequences of these interactions? First, the distinction between domestic and international politics gets blurred. Local issues turns out to be international. Second, it becomes less and less possible for states to declare that a certain problem is a matter of its internal affairs. If not for their goodwill, other states wants to exert influence because of the pressures from their domestic constituencies and lobbies. Third, due to high interconnectedness among multiple layers of politics, problems can also diffuse more easily, which in turn necessitates solutions that deal with all these layers. A national, and even sectoral, economic crisis, for example, can turn into a global one in a short span of time. That requires policy making that take interconnection among layers into consideration.

***Change in World Politics:*** The third component of the theory of GG has to be about the concept of change in world politics. The possibility of change in international politics is very limited in mainstream IR theories. Especially Waltzian structural realism is usually accused of having status quo bias.<sup>109</sup> Change (or lack of it) has two parts in neo-realist account. First, structural change is impossible because it is not possible to transform anarchy into hierarchy at the systemic level. Due to problems like relative gains, uncertainty, possibility of cheating etc. states cannot create a new structure that is not anarchic. States have always lived and will always live in anarchy. The second part of change in IR discussion in realism is about the change in distribution of power. The limited

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<sup>109</sup> Not only non-realist but also offensive realists made the point: Mearshimer (2001)

change realist talk about is when a systemic change in the distribution of power takes place. This can either be a change in the polar structure of system (from multi-polar, to bi-polar or unipolar, or vice versa) or it can be a change of hegemon as discussed by Gilpin's Hegemonic Stability Theory.<sup>110</sup>

Change in neo-liberal institutionalism is a little wider than realism, but still limited. For neo-liberal institutionalists although a total transformation of anarchy into a different logic of order is impossible, states can solve some of the problems stemming from anarchy through building international institutions.<sup>111</sup> To put it differently, different from realists, neo-liberal institutionalists argue that we can tame anarchy to a certain extent by building international institutions that facilitate cooperation by solving collective action problem, lack of information and monitoring etc. Yet, the change neo-liberal institutionalists talk about is the change of behavior and preferences of states as a result of new cost-benefit calculation. It is not about change of identity.

For constructivist theory, change in both structure of international system and in identity of states are possible. Wendt's famous claim "anarchy is what states make of it" illustrates that point. For constructivists, anarchy is a social institution, and as all social institutions it is based upon conventions among actors. If the actors in the system wants to agree on a new convention, it is nothing that can make it impossible. Thus states can transform the Hobbesian anarchy to a Lockean one, for example. Moreover, constructivist scholars theorize how state identities can be changed. While Wendt and Finnemore emphasize the systemic aspects of state identity change, for Hopf<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Gilpin (1981)

<sup>111</sup> Keohane (1984)

<sup>112</sup> Hopf, T. (2012)

it can be through transformations in the mass public. For Weldes,<sup>113</sup> and Clunan,<sup>114</sup> on the other hand, elite change is an important factor too.

How change is understood differently in GG? The concept of change in politics has to be a central component of GG theory. As I discussed above, one of the difference between those who think GG is possible and those who do not is that while the former group think we live in a qualitatively different world, the latter groups thinks it is just quantity that change in world politics (like numbers regarding trade or number of IOs today). Thus, contrary to realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, GG theory is about transformation of basic assumptions of mainstream IR theory, which include state-centricism (vs. multiple actors), system-level analysis (vs. multiple layers), anarchy (vs. governance), sovereignty (vs. multiple-loyalties), territoriality (vs. spheres of authority) etc. In that sense, GG is a theory of political change.

More specifically, GG theory differs from realism on the question of possibility of taming anarchy. One can even argue that raison d'être of GG theory is disagree with realists' belief in unchanging anarchy. As far as neo-liberal institutionalism is concerned, I think GG differs from it with regard to new actors in world politics. GG theory posits that changing world brought new actors into politics, which are neglected by neo-liberal institutionalism, like TANs and INGOs. Then, GG theory can (or should) answer the question like "how does the transformation in actors and layers in politics take place?", "what are the causes and dynamics that bring structural and ideational change into global politics?" I think it is not possible to find sufficient answers to these questions in mainstream IR theories.

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<sup>113</sup> Weldes, J. (1999).

<sup>114</sup> Clunan, A. (2009). *The social construction of Russia's resurgence : aspirations, identity, and security interests.*

As far as constructivism is concerned, GG theory-Constructivism interaction with regard to change should be seen as a two way street. On the one hand, GG writings so far have not discussed the role of identity and its change in a sufficient way. While technical aspects of political change and their effects on behavioral change of actors are theorized, scholars usually associated with GG have not integrated accompanying identity change a lot. On the other hand, theories of identity change in constructivism has to be supplemented by a substantial content that deals specifically with the effect of globalization and global governance. The GG theory, by benefiting from constructivist insights about identity change, can become a substantial theory of politics in the interconnected, globalized multi-actor/multi-layered world.

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